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STATE CALLS FOR AN ARTICLE FIVE 
CONVENTION: MOBILIZATION AND 
INTERPRETATION 
Gerard N. Magliocca* 
The Congress . . . on the Application of the Legislatures of 
two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for 
proposing Amendments . . . .1 
  Article V of the United States Constitution 
 
The threat is stronger than the execution.2 
  Chess aphorism 
 
Liberals and conservatives are sharply divided about how 
the Constitution should be interpreted, but one thing they do 
agree on is that pursuing their goals through the amendment 
process set forth in Article Five would be a waste of time.3  
The reasoning behind this conclusion is straightforward—it is 
just too hard to get the required supermajorities.4  Congress 
 
 *  Professor of Law, Indiana University – Indianapolis.  Many thanks to the 
Roosevelt Study Center in Middelburg, The Netherlands, which hosted me as I 
worked on this paper during my sabbatical. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art V. 
 2 Several different chess grandmasters, ranging from Jose Raul Capablanca to 
Aron Nimzowitsch, are given credit for this observation.  See EDWARD WINTER, 
CHESS FACTS AND FABLES (2005) (tracing the origin of this quote). 
 3 See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 
1741 (2007) (―We are now in the midst of great debates about abortion and religion, 
about federalism and the war powers of the presidency.  But nobody expects a 
constitutional amendment to resolve these issues . . . .‖); Stephen B. Presser, Some 
Thoughts on Our Present Discontents and Duties: The Cardinal, Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr., the Unborn, the Senate, and Us, 1 AVE MARIA L. REV. 113, 125 (2003) 
(explaining that the goal of overturning Roe v. Wade should not be sought through 
Article Five because it ―is now almost impossible to pass Constitutional 
Amendments‖). 
 4 See U.S. CONST. art. V. (requiring two-thirds of each house of Congress and 
three-quarters of the states to ratify a constitutional amendment); SANFORD 
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has not sent an amendment to the states since the 1970s, and 
that textual silence coincides with the emergence of 
increasingly complex (and, at times, incomprehensible) 
interpretive theories that try to justify desirable change 
without an amendment.5  Perhaps Article Five, like the 
Guarantee Clause, is now just one of the many federal 
constitutional clauses that are no longer operative.6 
This Essay challenges the view that Article Five is not a 
practical device for changing constitutional law by focusing on 
the power of two-thirds of the state legislatures to summon a 
successor to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention.7  Achieving 
reform through a new convention is basically a fantasy 
 
LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE CONSTITUTION GOES 
WRONG (AND HOW WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 160 (2006) (―Article V 
constitutes what may be the most important bars of our constitutional iron cage 
precisely because it works to make practically impossible needed changes in our 
polity.‖); Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?, 107 MICH. L. 
REV. 165, 211 (2008) (―My own inclination is to regard the possibility of formal 
constitutional amendment as generally remote.‖). 
 5 See, e.g., Adam M. Samaha, Dead Hand Arguments and Constitutional 
Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 619 (2008) (―Article V‘s stringency is a 
potential explanation for creative judicial ‗interpretation‘ of the text in a pinch, and 
an impetus for theories that that validate sources of supreme law not reflected in an 
Article V victory.‖).  But see LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 164 (―[T]he central thesis of 
this book is that there are limits to what even the most imaginative Congress, 
president, or Supreme Court can do to alleviate the deficiencies of the Constitution 
composed in 1787 and only infrequently formally amended thereafter.‖).  The last 
amendment sent to the states would have granted full voting rights to the District of 
Columbia.  See George Anastaplo, Amendments to the Constitution of the United 
States: A Commentary, 23 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 631, 834–35 (1992) (―For purposes of 
representation in the Congress, election of the President and Vice-President, and 
article V of this Constitution, the District [of Columbia] . . . shall be treated as 
though it were a State.‖).  The current hibernation of Article Five is not 
unprecedented.  For instance, there were no amendments proposed by Congress 
between 1804 (the Twelfth) and 1861 (a failed proposal to make slavery permanent), 
or between 1870 (the Fifteenth) and 1912 (the Sixteenth).  See AKHIL REED AMAR, 
AMERICA‘S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 336–47, 354, 395–409 (2005) (describing 
these amendments). 
 6 See generally Gerard N. Magliocca, Huey Long and the Guarantee Clause, 83 
TULANE L. REV. 1 (2009) (exploring the last time that the Guarantee Clause was 
taken seriously—in the 1930s). 
 7 This Essay draws on the excellent (though sparse) scholarship on this portion 
of Article Five.  See RUSSELL L. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKSMANSHIP: 
AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION (1988); DAVID E. KYVIG, 
EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 1776–1995 
(1996) (discussing attempts to use both procedures in Article Five); David Castro, 
Note, A Constitutional Convention: Scouting Article Five’s Undiscovered Country, 
134 U. PA. L. REV. 939 (1986); James Kenneth Rogers, Note, The Other Way to 
Amend the Constitution: The Article V Constitutional Convention Amendment 
Process, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 1005 (2007); see also Michael Stokes Paulsen, A 
General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of the Twenty-Seventh 
Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 733–61 (1993) (discussing the conventions option as 
part of a general discussion of Article Five). 
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because everybody (except for Sandy Levinson and a few 
others) is terrified by what may emerge.8  Nevertheless, the 
process of calling for such a conclave could be a powerful tool 
for mobilizing support and influencing the Justices, in part 
because the threat posed by a new convention is so unclear.9  
While there is now keen scholarly interest in how social 
movements reshape the constitutional culture by changing 
views and putting different judges on the bench, not enough 
attention is given to how direct appeals to Article Five can 
influence Congress and the Court.10 
Putting federal constitutional questions to the voters 
through state elections or referenda on a convention petition 
would enhance democratic participation in a positive 
fashion.11  During the last few election cycles, both parties 
sought to energize supporters by placing enticing state law 
initiatives (e.g., banning same-sex marriage, raising the 
minimum wage) on the ballot in key states.12  This 
 
 8 See LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 9 (calling for a new constitutional convention to 
correct structural defects in the text); LARRY J. SABATO, A MORE PERFECT 
CONSTITUTION: WHY THE CONSTITUTION MUST BE REVISED 8–9 (2008) (making a 
similar proposal); see also CAPLAN, supra note 7, at viii (quoting Justice Brennan‘s 
statement that ―I honestly doubt there‘s any prospect we want to go through the 
trauma of redoing the Constitution‖ and that it would be ―the most awful thing in 
the world‖). 
 9 One thing that makes a constitutional convention so frightening is that nobody 
has a clue how it would be organized.  See AMAR, supra note 5, at 291 (setting forth 
the unanswered questions about this process).  For instance, how would the 
delegates be chosen and what voting rules would prevail?  Would Congress or the 
states have the final word on that question?  Would judicial review apply to any of 
these decisions? 
 10 A significant exception, which this Essay spends time contemplating, is the 
movement for gender equality and the Equal Rights Amendment.  See, e.g., Serena 
Mayeri, Constitutional Choices: Legal Feminism and the Historical Dynamics of 
Change, 92 CAL. L. REV. 755 (2004); Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social 
Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto Era, 94 CAL. 
L. REV. 1323 (2006); see also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) 
(explaining how the passage of the ERA by Congress supported the application of 
heightened scrutiny for gender discrimination). 
 11 Just as there are many open questions about how a new constitutional 
convention would operate, there are many puzzles about the legal effect of state 
action under Article Five.  See Castro, supra note 7, at 940 (―The application of state 
legislatures for a constitutional convention raises a number of perplexing 
constitutional problems: . . . whether a state‘s application may lapse; whether an 
application must be specific or general; whether state referendums [sic] in favor of 
convention requests are valid; whether a state can rescind its application.‖  (footnote 
omitted)).  A state referendum on an Article Five issue is not binding and cannot 
impose any limits on the deliberations of state legislators, but it can be instructive in 
revealing public opinion.  See generally Vikram David Amar, The People Made Me 
Do It: Can the People of the States Instruct and Coerce Their State Legislators in the 
Article V Constitutional Amendment Process?, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1037 (2000) 
(providing a fine overview of this question). 
 12 See Michael J. Klarman, Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge), 104 MICH. L. 
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coordination between national campaigns and local elections 
might strike some as an abuse of federalism, but in an Article 
Five context it is a perfectly appropriate way of structuring a 
debate on vital issues.  Due to the intense interest that 
surrounds many constitutional questions, both parties stand 
to reap significant benefits (depending on the state or question 
involved) in higher turnout by using the petition process.  
Similar decisions on a given issue across a number of states 
would also send a clear signal about the wishes of the 
electorate; a signal that history shows may force Congress‘s 
hand before a bandwagon for a new convention becomes 
irresistible.13  In other words, Article Five can generate more 
involvement by citizens in constitutional law, which is 
contrary to the usual reading of that text as the ultimate 
barrier to popular opinion. 
Furthermore, a substantial number of state petitions for a 
new convention should—consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent—be considered persuasive authority in some 
constitutional cases.14  In a series of decisions involving the 
death penalty and the Due Process Clause, the Justices have 
looked to the actions of state legislatures for interpretive 
guidance on contemporary values.15  There is no reason why 
calls for a convention by those same legislatures should be 
treated any differently.16  Formal reasons aside, the Court is 
just as likely as Congress to feel the heat from a looming 
convention and revise its views if enough states send a signal 
that a certain decision was erroneous.  In this sense, the 
 
REV. 431, 463–72 (2005) (explaining how Republican activists arranged for anti-
same-sex marriage ballot propositions in 2004); John Gildersleeve, Note, Editing 
Direct Democracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of Ballot Initiatives Offend the 
First Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1467 (2007) (noting that Democrats 
used the same tactic with respect to the minimum wage in 2006). 
 13 See, e.g., AMAR, supra note 5, at 290 (―This alternative—a federal convention—
might never need to be deployed in order to have its desired effect.  Its mere 
potential availability might suffice to pry needed amendment proposals from a 
Congress desirous of maintaining control over the amendment agenda.‖). 
 14 One example that leads to the qualification of ―some‖ rather than ―all‖ cases 
involves the efforts of malapportioned state legislatures to overturn the line of 
authority begun by Baker v. Carr.  See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1009 (describing this 
movement); infra text accompanying notes 30–42. 
 15 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–67 (2005); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 570–73 (2003); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002).  Needless 
to say, originalists may not be impressed by this method of interpretation.  See 
generally Bradford R. Clark, Constitutional Structure, Judicial Discretion, and the 
Eighth Amendment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1149 (2006) (criticizing the recent 
Eighth Amendment cases as inconsistent with the Framers‘ design). 
 16 There are differences between a state statute and a legislative resolution 
calling for an Article Five convention, but Part III argues that these distinctions are 
immaterial for a judicial inquiry.  See infra text accompanying notes 74–75. 
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threat of a convention may indeed be stronger than its 
execution. 
In this Essay, Part I reviews prior attempts to use the 
Article Five petition procedure and shows that, when enough 
state legislatures join the cause, Congress usually provides a 
remedy to halt the march to a convention.  Part II looks at 
how putting federal constitutional issues before the voters in 
state races can increase the quality and quantity of citizen 
participation.  Part III explains why a critical mass of state 
petitions should be taken into account by courts when they are 
faced with related constitutional issues.   
 
I     BRANDISHING THE ULTIMATE WEAPON 
 
This Part outlines the history of state efforts to call for a 
new constitutional convention under Article Five.17  At the 
dawn of the Republic, petitions by Anti-Federalist legislatures 
in New York and Virginia for a conclave to consider 
amendments on personal liberties put pressure on Congress to 
pass the Bill of Rights.18  Following that brief (though 
important) debut, the petition procedure fell into disuse for 
more than one hundred years.19  In the twentieth century, 
 
 17 This inquiry draws on the fabulous appendix put together by Michael Stokes 
Paulsen in 1993, in which he gathered every state convention application in one 
place for the first time.  See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 764–89.  Since 1993, most 
states have, if anything, been trying to withdraw prior applications.  See SABATO, 
supra note 8, at 210 (―Since Paulsen‘s work was published, three states (Arizona, 
Idaho, and Utah) have passed resolutions explicitly rescinding all their previous 
applications for a Constitutional Convention . . . .‖). 
 18 See AMAR, supra note 5, at 290 (―[T]his is precisely what happened with the 
Bill of Rights, which the First Congress drafted largely to silence cries for a new 
convention.‖); CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 165–68 (reproducing the petitions by the 
Virginia and New York legislatures for a convention to amend the 1787 text).  In 
essence, these petitions were a formal expression of the bargain struck in certain 
ratifying conventions whereby the Federalists won over skeptics by pledging to add a 
Bill of Rights as soon as possible.  See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 70–74 (making this 
point in a discussion about the ratification conventions). 
 19 According to the Paulsen Appendix, there were only seven convention petitions 
between 1788 and 1893.  The first came from Georgia in 1832, while the second was 
issued a year later by Alabama and was probably related to South Carolina‘s 
attempt to nullify a federal tariff.  See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 765, 769; see also 
GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, ANDREW JACKSON AND THE CONSTITUTION 59–60 (2007) 
(describing the nullification issue).  The other five petitions came in 1861 (from 
Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, and Virginia) and did not specify a topic, though it 
is obvious from the timing that secession and slavery were involved.  See Paulsen, 
supra note 7, at 770, 772, 781, 787; cf. 1 ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE‘S 
COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE COMMONWEALTH 
OF VIRGINIA 371 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1996) (1803) (predicting that an 
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though, there were three occasions in which the States came 
close to invoking the supreme constitutional authority.20 
 
A     The Seventeenth Amendment 
 
Without question, the most successful invocation of 
Article Five by the states involved the Seventeenth 
Amendment, which provided for the direct election of 
Senators.21  Though this amendment passed the House of 
Representatives several times between 1894 and 1912, the 
Senate emphatically rejected any efforts to change its 
makeup.22  Stymied by this self-dealing, supporters of the 
amendment appealed to state legislatures and got an 
overwhelming response.23 
Not only did thirty-one states—one short of the total 
required at the time—issue requests for a new convention, but 
these acts were coordinated.24  When Pennsylvania joined the 
 
Article Five convention ―will probably never be resorted to, unless the federal 
government should betray symptoms of corruption, which may render it expedient 
for the states to exert themselves in order to the application of some radical and 
effectual remedy‖). 
 20 Some other noteworthy (but long-forgotten) calls for a constitutional 
convention involved: (1) a ban on polygamy, which was backed by twenty-six states; 
(2) a limitation on the federal government‘s post-Sixteenth Amendment power to tax 
incomes, which was supported by almost twenty states; (3) an amendment 
overturning Roe v. Wade, which got the support of 19 states.  See CAPLAN, supra 
note 7, at 66, 69, 71–72 (describing these petition drives); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 
190–91, 336, 449 (same).  The Paulsen Appendix lists each state‘s applications on 
these and other issues. 
 21 See U.S. CONST. amend. XVII; KVIEG, supra note 7, at 208-09 (providing the 
background for this change). 
 22 See Walter Clark, The Next Constitutional Convention of the United States, 16 
YALE L.J. 65, 72 (1906) (―Five times has a bill, proposing such amendment to the 
Constitution, passed the House of Representatives by a practically unanimous vote, 
and each time it has been lost in the Senate; but never by a direct vote. It has 
always been disposed of by the chloroform process of referring the bill to a 
committee, which never reports it back, and never will.‖); see also KYVIG, supra note 
7, at 210 (―States had applied for a convention before but on no occasion in 
influential numbers.‖). 
 23 Since state legislatures elected Senators under the original Constitution, one 
might wonder why they were receptive to giving up this power.  Part of the answer is 
that public demands for direct elections were increasing, but there was also the 
problem that legislatures often deadlocked over Senate choices and were paralyzed 
for weeks or sometimes months as a result.  See, e.g., David R. Stras, Understanding 
the New Politics of Judicial Appointments, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1033, 1059–60 (2008) 
(―One reason for the Seventeenth Amendment was that many states experienced 
deadlock in the election of senators when one party controlled one state legislative 
chamber and a different party controlled the other.‖). 
 24 See CHRISTOPHER HYDE HOEBEKE, THE ROAD TO MASS DEMOCRACY: ORIGINAL 
INTENT AND THE SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT 149 (1995) (―[T]he majority of states 
were willing to risk opening Pandora‘s Box for the sake of securing the popular 
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call around 1900, the Legislature sent its resolution to every 
other state as a model and urged them to vote yes.25  And by 
1906 the clamor for change was so great that an interstate 
meeting was held under the leadership of the Governor of 
Iowa to establish a lobbying group dedicated to this one 
constitutional reform.26  Writing in the Yale Law Journal that 
year, the Chief Justice of the North Carolina Supreme Court 
declared ―[i]t is high time that we had a Constitutional 
Convention,‖ in part because ―[i]t is too much to expect that 
the great corporations which control a majority of the Senate 
will ever voluntarily transfer to the people their profitable and 
secure hold upon supreme power.‖27 
Faced with these emphatic statements by the very 
legislatures that elected them and with the real prospect of a 
second convention, the Senate backed down in 1912.28  At least 
one Senator, Weldon B. Hayburn of Idaho, expressly stated 
that the convention threat was credible and dangerous 
because it could lead to almost anything: 
[Article Five] does not contemplate that any constitutional 
convention shall assemble with a limitation on it to deal 
with a particular question.  When the constitutional 
convention meets it is the people, and it is the same people 
who made the original Constitution, and no limitation in 
the original Constitution controls the people when they 
meet again to consider the Constitution.29 
 
election of senators.‖); see also CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 63–64 (recounting these 
events).  To be fair, there were some disputes about the precise count because not all 
of the states used the same language in their resolutions.  Nevertheless, the 
consensus seems to be that thirty-one states were on record in support of a 
convention by the time the Seventeenth Amendment was ratified. 
 25 See RALPH A. ROSSUM, FEDERALISM, THE SUPREME COURT, AND THE 
SEVENTEENTH AMENDMENT: THE IRONY OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 193 (2001) 
(stating that ―[i]n 1900, the Pennsylvania legislature took the decisive step of 
suggesting to the states a coordinated effort to demand a convention; believing that 
the Senate would not act until two-thirds of the states forced it to do so, it sent to all 
the states a copy of its convention petition and encouraged them to submit one as 
well‖); CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 63 (stating that the Pennsylvania legislature formed 
a standing committee to pursue this goal). 
 26 See HOEBEKE, supra note 24, at 149 (―In 1906, Governor Albert 
Cummins . . . called a meeting of delegates from the several states to discuss 
strategies for getting the Congress to call a federal convention, resulting in the 
formation of a national lobby organization dedicated specifically for the purpose.‖). 
 27 Clark, supra note 22, at 72. 
 28 See ROSSUM, supra note 25, at 194 (―The fear of a ‗runaway‘ constitutional 
convention, along with the fact that most senators represented states whose 
legislatures were on record as favoring direct election of the Senate, proved 
decisive.‖); cf. CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 62 (noting that by this time both the 
Democratic National Convention and President Taft supported the change). 
 29 46 CONG. REC. 2769 (1911) (statement of Sen. Heyburn).  Just as an aside, the 
Confederate Constitution expressly addressed the possibility of ―runaway‖ bodies by 
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While this fear of a runaway convention probably helped 
spur the Senate to act on the Seventeenth Amendment, the 
debates do not reveal anything definitive on that point.  
Nonetheless, what is clear that state legislative action under 
Article Five played a critical role is informing the Senate that 
their process of election no longer retained the support of the 
American people. 
 
B     State Legislative Apportionment 
 
The next major use of Article Five petitions also involved 
structural reform and self-dealing, but during the 1960s it was 
the state legislatures themselves who were the bad actors as 
they tried to reverse the Supreme Court‘s view that they were 
unconstitutionally apportioned.30  Following the ―one-person, 
one-vote‖ decision in Baker v. Carr,31 outraged state 
legislatures responded by endorsing a series of amendments to 
protect states‘ rights.32  The only one that gathered steam was 
an amendment that would permit one house of a state 
legislature to be apportioned on a basis other than 
population.33  Thirty-three states—one short of the magic 
number—sent petitions to Congress, and the Senate 
Republican leader, Everett Dirksen, sought to move the 
amendment through Congress.34 
 
providing that a convention could only consider specific amendments proposed by 
the States.  See CONF. CONST. art. V, § 1 (stating that a convention shall ―take into 
consideration such amendments to the Constitution as the said States shall concur 
in suggesting at the time the said demand is made‖). 
 30 See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring equal apportionment 
of seats in state legislatures so that different districts have roughly equal 
populations); CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 73–78 (exploring the controversy following 
the decision). 
 31 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
 32 See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 73.  One of these proposals would have let two-
thirds of the state legislatures propose and ratify amendments without any action by 
Congress.  See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Proposed Amendment of Article V: A 
Threatened Disaster, 72 YALE L. J. 957, 958 (1963) (―Whenever applications from the 
Legislatures of two-thirds of the total number of states of the United States shall 
contain identical texts of an amendment to be proposed, the President of the Senate 
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall so certify, and the 
amendment as contained in the application shall be deemed to have been proposed, 
without further action by Congress.‖); see also William G. Ross, Attacks on the 
Warren Court by State Officials: A Case Study of Why Court-Curbing Movements 
Fail, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 483, 529–85 (2002) (undertaking a thorough analysis of this 
proposal and others made by the states at the time). 
 33 See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 74; see also KYVIG, supra note 7, at 374 (stating 
that these petitions asked for an amendment providing that the states could use 
―any criteria as in its wisdom may be in its individual best interest‖). 
 34 See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1009 (―By 1969, thirty-three states had submitted 
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Once lawmakers realized that another convention could 
be at hand, a debate broke out over whether malapportioned 
legislatures could legitimately invoke Article Five on an issue 
of direct concern to them.35  Senator Robert F. Kennedy said 
that Congress ―must possess power to rule upon the validity of 
the submitted resolutions,‖ while another Senator declared 
that any resolution from a malapportioned legislature should 
be rejected.36  Of course, it was not at all clear that Senators 
had this power, since Article Five states that Congress shall 
call a convention if two-thirds of the states apply, and at least 
some of the Framers said that there was no discretion on the 
issue.37  A federal district court held Utah‘s petition invalid 
because its legislature was not in compliance with the Court‘s 
apportionment decisions, but that did not clearly resolve the 
issue.38 
In any event, most contemporary observers were 
convinced that the amendment‘s supporters, most notably 
Senator Dirksen, were only using the convention threat to 
prompt congressional action.39  As The Wall Street Journal 
explained: 
Most Dirksen-watchers agree he doesn‘t really want a 
Constitutional Convention.  The idea rather is to terrorize 
liberal Senators with the thought of a runaway convention 
that would start tinkering with the Bill of Rights.  To avoid 
such a calamity, the reasoning goes, Congress itself would 
 
applications calling for a convention to address the apportionment issue, one short of 
the thirty-four needed.‖); see also 112 CONG. REC. 8580–81 (1966) (statement of Sen. 
Dirksen) (―[T]his issue will not die.  Neither will it fade away, believe me.‖). 
 35 There is an analogy here to the problem presented during Reconstruction 
about whether a Congress that excluded southerners could propose an Article Five 
amendment or whether the states that were excluded could ratify one.  See 2 BRUCE 
ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS 101–19 (1998) (examining these 
issues).  It is worth noting that after Baker Congress had no problem letting the 
same malapportioned legislatures ratify the Twenty-Fourth and Twenty-Fifth 
Amendments. 
 36 113 CONG. REC. 10105 (1967) (statement of Sen. Kennedy); see id. at 10102 
(statement of Sen. Tydings) (offering a lengthy defense of Congress‘s power to 
control the amendment process). 
 37 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 85, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961) (―The words of this article are peremptory.  The Congress ‗shall call a 
convention.‘  Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.‖). 
 38 See Petuskey v. Rampton, 307 F. Supp. 235, 252 (D. Utah 1969), rev’d on other 
grounds, 431 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1970) (quoting Senator Ribicoff‘s position that this 
would allow ―the rotten boroughs to decide whether they should continue to be 
rotten‖); see also KYVIG, supra note 7, at 377 (―Dirksen scoffed at such objections.  
Neither the drafters of Article V nor the Congress in 180 years ever talked about the 
form of petitions, he pointed out; content and purpose were what mattered.‖). 
 39 There is no indication that the Justices considered backing down from their 
apportionment decisions, though it is not clear that any opportunity to do so was 
available. 
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propose to the states for ratification a Constitutional 
amendment.40 
Dirksen‘s sudden death in 1969 took some of the air out of 
this campaign, and states that had endorsed a new convention 
began rescinding their applications.41  This was driven partly 
by a fear of a runaway convention, but also by the more 
practical explanation that by then some of these legislatures 
were reapportioned and no longer interested in going back to 
the old system.42 
Thus, the reapportionment debate, unlike the 
Seventeenth Amendment example, offers a cautionary tale 
about Article Five.  It suggests that petitions from the states 
run the risk of thwarting the popular will if they become 
nothing more than a tool for legislators to protect their 
privileged status.  Fortunately, this is the only instance of 
such behavior and does not cast doubt upon the idea of using 
this procedure in other contexts. 
 
C     The Balanced Budget Amendment 
 
The most recent attempt to initiate a constitutional 
convention involved a proposed federal Balanced Budget 
Amendment.  Drawing support from the growing conservative 
movement, this call gathered the support of thirty states by 
1980 despite opposition from President Carter and Senator 
Goldwater, who warned of dire consequences if a convention 
were called.43  With the enthusiastic backing of President 
Reagan, the Senate passed the amendment by more than the 
required supermajority, but the House of Representatives 
rejected the idea.44  This motivated Missouri to join the 
convention drive, which brought the count to thirty-two—just 
 
 40 Arlen J. Large, Dirksen’s Crusade, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1969, at 1. 
 41 See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 76 (discussing Dirksen‘s death and the about-face 
by North Carolina). 
 42 See id. (―Republicans emerged as the major beneficiaries of reapportionment, 
as they picked up seats in newly drawn suburban districts.  Seeing that one-
person/one-vote was not necessarily inimical to rural interests, a majority of the 
state began to comply with reapportionment, and support for the amendment 
waned.‖); SABATO, supra note 8, at 203 (―The remaining state legislatures got cold 
feet, mainly about the undefined idea of a convention.‖). 
 43 See 125 CONG. REC. 3159 (1979) (statement of Sen. Goldwater) (calling a 
convention ―very foolhardy‖ and a ―tragic mistake‖); CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 81–82 
(quoting President Carter‘s statement to the Speaker of the Ohio House of 
Representatives that a convention ―might do serious, irrevocable damage to the 
Constitution‖). 
 44 See Rogers, supra note 7, at 1009; see also KYVIG, supra note 7, at 435 
(describing Reagan‘s support for the Balanced Budget Amendment). 
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two short of the magic number.45 
In response to these demands for action, Congress enacted 
the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act, which mandated automatic 
spending cuts if the budget deficit exceeded a certain level.46  
While this did indicate that the Article Five petitions were 
having an impact on Congress, many members clearly hoped 
that the statute would halt the momentum for a constitutional 
remedy.47  That strategy proved successful, as other state 
legislatures considering petitions backed off, partly because of 
the usual fear of a runaway convention and partly because of 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings.48 
Undaunted by this resistance, Ronald Reagan became the 
only sitting President to ask undecided states to put a 
convention request over the top.  While rejecting suggestions 
that he should include this plea in a State of the Union, he did 
write letters to state legislators, such as this one to a state 
senator in Montana: 
I . . . believe that further action by the States, and 
particularly by the Montana Legislature, in petitioning 
Congress to call for a constitutional convention for the sole 
purpose of writing a balanced budget amendment will go 
far towards convincing Congress to pass and submit to the 
States an amendment for this purpose.  If your effort is 
successful, Montana would be the 33rd State to pass such a 
resolution, just one short of the 34 required to call a 
constitutional convention.  I believe this may finally 
 
 45 See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 83; KYVIG, supra note 7, at 440. 
 46 See Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub L. No 99-
177, 99 Stat. 1037, invalidated in part by Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); E. 
Donald Elliott, Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 
1098 (stating that ―Gramm-Rudman-Hollings was passed in part to stave off the 
drive to call a constitutional convention‖). 
  When a portion of the Act was challenged on separation-of-powers grounds, the 
Comptroller General told the Supreme Court that accepting this claim might assist 
the convention movement.  See Brief of Appellant Comptroller General of the United 
States at 14, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986), Nos. 85-1377, 85-1378, 85-1379 
(―If the Constitution we have is ruled too inflexible to accommodate the experiment 
of the 1985 Act, . . . the result may be to add momentum to a convention and to 
unwise constitutional amendments that would take much longer to reverse.‖).  The 
point was not mentioned in the Court‘s opinion, probably because the challenge was 
relatively minor and severable from the rest of the statute. 
 47 See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 84–85 (―In March 1986 the Republican Senate 
failed by one vote to approve a balanced-budget constitutional amendment; Gramm-
Rudman, as a palatable excuse to oppose the convention or its object, was given 
credit for the defeat.‖); KYVIG, supra note 7, at 442 (―In part, the 1986 defeat 
appeared to be due to the recent passage of ordinary legislation to limit deficits.‖). 
 48 See SABATO, supra note 8, at 203–04 (―Just as with reapportionment, the fervor 
waned as states faced up to the great unknown of a convention, and no more states 
made application for a Balanced Budget Amendment.‖); see also CAPLAN, supra note 
7, at 83–84 (describing some of these setbacks). 
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convince Congress to act on an amendment of its own, 
which has always been my goal.49 
As with Senator Dirksen, Reagan‘s support for a 
convention was revealed here as a bluff designed to pry a 
constitutional amendment out of Congress.  In spite of this 
aggressive jawboning, though, no other state answered 
Reagan‘s call. 
In sum, the limited history of state action to call a 
constitutional convention suggests that, while there are some 
pitfalls, this is a sound way of forcing issues onto the national 
agenda that would otherwise be ignored.  While one may 
disagree with the substance behind some of these initiatives, 
their effort to engage our citizens in a serious and widespread 
debate about constitutional issues deserves more careful 
consideration from political activists, legislators, and judges. 
 
II     ENGAGING THE ELECTORATE 
 
This Part assesses the merits of using Article Five 
petitions as a tool for mobilizing voters and influencing the 
constitutional culture.50  In essence, there are two questions 
raised by the analysis.  First, why might the use of Article 
Five be superior as a general matter to other methods of 
altering constitutional law?51  Second, why is the Article Five 
petition procedure better than going straight to Congress for a 
textual amendment? 
 
A     Direct Action and the Equal Rights Amendment 
 
The most thoughtful discussion about the value of making 
a direct appeal to Article Five, rather than relying solely on 
litigation to achieve constitutional reform, came from the 
 
 49 CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 86–87. 
 50 Perhaps the most perceptive commentary on the importance of shaping the 
constitutional culture comes from Reva Siegel.  See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1325 
(defining constitutional culture as ―the understandings of role and practices of 
argument that guide interactions among citizens and officials in matters concerning 
the Constitution‘s meaning‖). 
 51 Obviously, this discussion excludes structural amendments (such as the 
equality of states within the Senate) that can only be addressed through Article 
Five.  See LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 23 (―One cannot, as a practical matter, litigate 
the obvious inequality attached to Wyoming‘s having the same voting power in the 
Senate as California.‖). 
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women‘s movement of the 1960s and 1970s.52  Leaders of that 
cause argued that their best strategy involved waging a grass-
roots campaign for the ERA while simultaneously pressing 
courts to give heightened scrutiny to gender distinctions under 
the Equal Protection Clause.53  As Mary Eastwood of the 
National Organization for Women (NOW) said: 
[E]ven if the ERA fails to pass, vigorously pushing for it will 
show women are demanding equal rights and 
responsibilities under the law by the most drastic legal 
means possible—a constitutional amendment. The effect, 
provided we make clear we think [the] 14th [amendment] 
properly interpreted should give women [the] same 
unqualified protection, would be to improve our chances of 
winning the 14th amendment cases.54 
Despite the ERA‘s failure to get ratified by a sufficient 
number of states, the fight for that amendment was successful 
in the sense that the Supreme Court used the resources 
developed in that debate as a justification in cases 
invalidating gender discrimination.55 
The ―failure‖ of the ERA is a reminder that the merits of 
the Article Five process should not be judged exclusively on 
whether an amendment is produced.  Under that test, Article 
Five looks useless because of the high threshold necessary to 
achieve success.  Instead, the question should be whether 
Article Five can be an effective tool for changing constitutional 
attitudes when used in conjunction with other means.  The 
answer to that question is yes for two reasons. 
 
 52 Another significant example involved the campaign to overturn the Supreme 
Court‘s decision holding that a federal income tax was almost always 
unconstitutional.  See Pollock v. Farmers‘ Home Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 618 
(1895) (holding that the income tax must be consistent with the Direct Tax Clause).  
In that instance, reformers pressed for the Sixteenth Amendment and for tax 
legislation that would challenge the Justices to overrule their precedent.  See KYVIG, 
supra note 7, at 201–07 (discussing this debate). 
 53 See Mayeri, supra note 10, at 791 (―With NOW‘s embrace of the ERA [in 1967], 
feminism had taken a momentous step toward a dual constitutional strategy, one 
that would combine litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment with active 
advocacy for the ERA.‖). 
 54 Siegel, supra note 10, at 1368. 
 55 See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 687–88 (1973) (stating that the 
passage of the ERA by a supermajority in Congress meant that ―classifications based 
upon sex are inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of 
Government is not without significance to the question presently under 
consideration‖); Michael J. Klarman, Rethinking the Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 
Revolutions, 82 VA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1996) (footnote omitted) (stating that the Justices 
―did not invalidate a single law on sex discrimination grounds until 1971—that is, 
not until after the explosion in social and political support for the women‘s 
movement in the late 1960s‖); see also Siegel, supra note 10, at 1334 (quoting Justice 
Ginsburg‘s view that ―[t]here is no practical difference between what has evolved 
and the ERA‖). 
2009 ARTICLE FIVE CONVENTION  87 
First, a litigation strategy (modeled on the one used by 
the NAACP to attack segregation) that lacks a political 
component is fragile because of its reliance on elite opinion.  
While lawsuits do raise public awareness about controversial 
issues, they do not engage ordinary citizens in any meaningful 
way.  This void not only harms the legitimacy of any resulting 
constitutional change, but it opens the door to reasonable 
charges that the courts are simply imposing their values on 
society in a way that voters might well reject if given the 
chance.56  That conclusion is more difficult to draw when 
voters have expressed substantial support for similar ideas in 
the political realm through legislation or a proposed 
constitutional amendment—even if those efforts are not 
successful.57 
Second, the expression of this support through Article 
Five sends a clear signal that ordinary politics cannot match.58  
Consider for a moment how constitutional preferences are 
usually conveyed.  There are presidential and, to a lesser 
extent, congressional elections, but so many issues are 
wrapped up in an election that it rarely can be read as making 
an unambiguous point about a constitutional issue.  Judicial 
confirmation hearings are another significant forum for these 
discussions, but in that context decorum usually precludes a 
nominee from answering questions about the controversial 
matters that most people want to hear about.  Thus, these 
mediating institutions simply do not elicit the kind of direct 
citizen participation and feedback on constitutional matters 
that an appeal to Article Five does.59 
 
 56 See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1343 (―Popular debate about the Constitution 
forges relations among citizens and officials, promoting forms of attaching and 
enabling forms of steering that enhance the public‘s confidence that the Constitution 
is theirs.‖); see also Klarman, supra note 12, at 475 (―[J]udicially mandated social 
reform may mobilize greater resistance than change accomplished through 
legislatures or with the acquiescence of other democratically operated institutions.‖). 
 57 A contrary argument can be made, and was made during the ERA fight, that 
an active debate on a constitutional amendment should preclude a judicial 
reexamination of precedent.  See Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 692 (Powell, J., concurring) 
(―[T]he Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state 
legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic process, are debating the 
proposed Amendment.‖).  In other words, a decision to seek an amendment could be 
read as a concession that existing practice is constitutional.  While this is a serious 
objection, it ultimately falls short.  See infra text accompanying notes 75–76. 
 58 Civil disobedience, which cannot really be characterized as normal politics, can 
send a powerful message on these subjects, but engaging in that sort of direct action 
is costly.  See Siegel, supra note 10, at 1355 (―At crucial junctures of American 
constitutional development, groups have effectively employed civil disobedience to 
advance claims about the meaning of the United States Constitution.‖). 
 59 Just to be clear, I am not saying that social movements cannot successfully 
bring about constitutional change without using Article Five.  Indeed, I wrote an 
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B     The Petition Process and Bringing Voters to the Polls 
 
Once Article Five is seen as an attractive way of 
influencing the legal culture rather than a provision that 
makes it nearly impossible to produce constitutional text, the 
next question is whether the best use of that process involves 
lobbying Congress or state legislatures.  The answer is that 
state petitions are better because they are more likely to give 
voters a chance to voice their opinions.60 
One distinction between invoking the Article Five 
convention option and seeking a constitutional amendment is 
that getting at least some states to take up the call is much 
easier than getting the relevant committees of Congress 
interested.  No matter what change is on the table, supporters 
will always be able to find a few outlier states that will offer 
enthusiastic support.  The beauty of our federal system is that 
those who want to start a drive to ban same-sex marriage can 
find a haven in Mississippi while those who want a 
constitutional right to health care can look to Vermont.  
Moreover, in these states the issue can be placed before voters 
or legislators quickly to build support for an issue across the 
nation.61  Jumpstarting this sort of effort in Congress, by 
contrast, is harder because the threshold for getting 
 
entire book about one movement—Jacksonian Democracy—that did exactly that.  
See MAGLIOCCA, supra note 19.  The point is that the advantages of using Article 
Five—especially the petition procedure—are underestimated. 
 60 This is a good place to discuss the question of whether a convention request 
can be limited to a specific subject.  See Paulsen, supra note 7, at 737–49 (reviewing 
the competing arguments and concluding that no such limit may be imposed).  
Needless to say, the clarity of the information that an Article Five petition gives to 
other governmental bodies would be undermined if the states could make only a 
general call for a convention.  Furthermore, based on the actions of the 1787 
Convention, which went far beyond its mandate to ―amend‖ the Articles of 
Confederation, see KYVIG, supra note 7, at 42–46, it seems clear that a constitutional 
conclave can propose any amendments that it deems appropriate no matter what the 
originating state legislatures might say. 
  This does not mean, however, that topic limitations in an Article Five petition 
are invalid or without value.  A convention that sought to exceed its instructions 
would face significant criticism and would have to justify its acts once its proposals 
became available.  See SABATO, supra note 8, at 206 (―[F]rom a purely practical 
vantage point, there is little doubt that a convention would be guided by its mandate 
from Congress and the states.‖).  More important, the whole point of this Article is 
how the Article Five process can contribute to legal change without the actual 
summoning of a convention, thus I am not especially concerned about the effect of 
the petitions on a convention. 
 61 The votes in these early states are also easy to get because they are not fraught 
with concern that the threshold needed for holding a convention is near.  In other 
words, legislators in the fifth state to ask for a convention have a much freer vote 
than the ones in the thirtieth state. 
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something on its radar screen is a lot higher.62  Congress has a 
more crowded agenda than the average state legislature, and 
in any event supporters of an amendment need a large base of 
support to overcome the inertia within the congressional 
committee system. 
Another advantage of using Article Five petitions is that 
they can piggyback on the initiative and referendum 
procedure in many states and bypass the resistance that 
might be found within a legislature.  While a referendum 
requesting a convention is not binding on a state legislature, a 
yes vote would probably exert a powerful influence on local 
officials considering such a petition.63  An even more 
important point, though, is that it is easier in many states to 
get an initiative on the ballot than it is to get action through 
the legislature, and that is especially true as compared to 
getting action from Congress.  There is no federal equivalent 
to a state referendum, which makes it difficult for outsiders to 
get Congress to move an amendment unless they turn to the 
states for leverage. 
Finally, there is a nuts-and-bolts benefit that comes from 
using Article Five petitions, and that is that they represent a 
lure for voter turnout that political professionals of all stripes 
can use.  When asked to explain the key to politics, Abraham 
Lincoln allegedly said, ―Find ‗em and vote ‗em.‖64  Giving 
people a chance to vote on constitutional questions that they 
feel strongly about is a fantastic way to identify supporters, 
whether they are conservative or liberal, and get them to the 
polls.  In part, that is due to the sheer magnitude of these 
issues, but another reason is that voters are not often asked 
for their views on these matters and are probably eager to give 
them.65  As noted earlier, both parties are already employing 
this tactic through state constitutional amendments, and the 
 
 62 There are certainly outlier members of Congress who will support most any 
amendment, but that is less likely to lead to anything meaningful than the action of 
legislatures in outlier states.  The latter creates a public record and can garner 
significant public attention.  The former will disappear into obscurity. 
 63 See supra note 11.  In a sense, this is the same point that was just made about 
the effect of the Article Five petitions on a constitutional convention.  See supra note 
60. 
 64 I am unable to trace the original source of this quote, which leads me to think 
that it may be one of the many false statements attributed to Lincoln.  In any event, 
the point expressed by the quote is still useful. 
 65 This could be done either through a referendum or by making an Article Five 
petition a key issue in state legislative elections.  Of course, one might say that these 
are just symbolic votes until the two-thirds threshold is in sight.  Then again, 
politics is often about symbolism. 
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same logic applies to Article Five petitions.66  Finally, this 
approach is especially attractive for a political party that is 
out of power at the national level, as is currently true for 
Republicans, as the states may be the only place where its 
ideas can gain traction.   
 
C     Runaway Train? 
 
Although there are many persuasive reasons for political 
activists to use the convention procedure to awaken the 
electorate, this tactic is probably not the choice of first resort 
because of the fear of what would happen if a convention were 
actually convened.67  In each of the precedents discussed in 
Part I, the prospect of a runaway body that would tear the 
Constitution limb from limb was a factor in either spurring 
congressional action or leading undecided states to reject the 
petition option.  Nevertheless, this concern is exaggerated and 
should not unduly restrain the use of the Article Five process. 
The trepidation about using the convention threat 
parallels the criticism about mutually assured destruction 
(MAD) during the Cold War.  Nuclear deterrence was great at 
keeping the peace, but what if the bluff of retaliation was 
actually called?  While this was a valid point, the reality was 
that the uncertainty surrounding the outcome of a nuclear 
war was so great that no rational (or irrational) leader ever 
wanted to take that risk.  A constitutional convention is the 
ultimate legal weapon, and in that context one must ask 
whether policymakers would really allow a convention to 
happen or would blink (as they have on every previous 
occasion when the two-thirds threshold was near).  Put 
another way, the numerous advantages of invoking the Article 
Five process outweigh the risks posed by the tiny probability 
that a convention would be summoned. 
Furthermore, the analogy between nuclear deterrence and 
a constitutional conclave is imperfect because a convention, 
unlike an ICBM, can only propose changes rather than impose 
them.  Though a convention would be free to establish almost 
 
 66 Furthermore, the Article Five path is more conservative as a mobilization tool 
than using state law.  After all, state law ballot initiatives almost always have 
concrete results.  A constitutional petition, on the other hand, has no effect within a 
state unless many other states join the call and compel Congress to act. 
 67 Another explanation for the lack of convention petitions is a dearth of 
resources.  A great advantage of using litigation for public interest law is that it can 
be done a shoestring budget.  Putting the same question to voters, even in the states, 
may be prohibitively expensive. 
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any ratification process that it wanted based on the precedent 
of 1787, voters would still have the final word on the 
delegates‘ work product.68  Accordingly, even in the extremely 
unlikely event that a convention came to pass, its runaway 
quality would be constrained by the need to get majority 
support in any subsequent ratification proceedings. 
In my view, the central insight of the women‘s movement 
is still a powerful one—a direct appeal to Article Five is an 
excellent, if underutilized, way of mobilizing support for 
constitutional change.  The Article Five petition process offers 
specific advantages for those seeking reform and for those who 
want to harness the energy that such an effort can unleash.  
And as the next Part explains, these advantages are not 
confined to the political arena. 
 
III     A TALLY OF STATES AT THE COURT 
 
This Part explores how the Article Five petition process 
can influence judicial interpretation.  First, a call by a 
significant number of states for a convention is evidence on 
contemporary constitutional standards that the Supreme 
Court deems relevant in many doctrinal areas when the same 
states pass legislation.  Second, the Justices are just as 
susceptible as Congress to pressure from a possible convention 
and may be induced to back down from an unpopular decision 
if the threat is strong enough. 
The argument for a connection between Article Five 
petitions and judicial interpretation is simple: there is no 
material difference between the consensus revealed by state 
legislation on a particular topic, which the Court deems 
persuasive authority in at least some contexts, and a 
consensus revealed when the same state legislatures pass 
convention petitions.  As a result, the adoption of Article Five 
resolutions in a critical mass of states ought to count in the 
formal deliberations of the Court on some constitutional 
questions.69 
 
 68 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 40, at 251 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (explaining the Convention‘s decision to depart from the unanimity rule of the 
Articles of Confederation for amendments). 
 69 More specifically, I am saying that these petitions should be taken into account 
to the same extent that state legislation would count.  It would be hard to say that 
the petitions are relevant if state legislation is clearly not.  On the other hand, while 
Article Five petitions can reach any subject, state legislation may be absent with 
respect to certain topics due to federal preemption or prior judicial decisions that 
foreclose state action.  No such barrier confronts the petitions. 
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On subjects ranging from the Eighth Amendment to the 
Due Process Clause, the Justices look to the actions of state 
legislatures to assess current standards or traditions.70  For 
example, with respect to what constitutes cruel and unusual 
punishment, the Court holds that state statutes give the 
―clearest and most reliable objective evidence of contemporary 
values.‖71  Indeed, the cases in that area often tally the 
number of states that permit a particular application of the 
death penalty as part of a determination of its validity.72  
Likewise, many substantive due process decisions on highly 
sensitive issues, such as assisted suicide, consensual sodomy, 
and abortion take stock of state legislation to determine 
whether something is a fundamental right.73 
Putting aside the controversy about how much weight 
these state acts should receive when deciding federal 
 
 70 The Court‘s recent Second Amendment opinion also nodded in that direction by 
suggesting that the scope of the individual right to possess guns would be 
determined, in part, by looking to traditional restrictions defined by state law.  See 
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008) (―[N]othing in our 
opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession 
of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms 
in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing 
conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.‖). 
 71 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 331 (1989); see Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 564 (2005) (stating that ―[t]he beginning point is a review of objective indicia of 
consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have 
addressed the question.  These data give us essential instruction‖).  One could say 
that the Eighth Amendment represents a special case because the use of the word 
―unusual‖ in the text compels courts to look at modern standards in a way that is not 
true for other constitutional provisions.  See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 
822 n.7 (1988) (plurality opinion) (―Part of the rationale for this index of 
constitutional value lies in the very language of the construed clause: whether an 
action is ‗unusual‘ depends, in common usage, on the frequency of its occurrence or 
the magnitude of its acceptance.‖). 
 72 See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2651–52 (2008) (noting that only six 
states permitted the execution of a child rapist who did not kill the victim); Roper, 
543 U.S. at 563 (―30 states prohibit the juvenile death penalty, including 12 that 
have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by express 
provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach.‖); Atkins v. 
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002) (surveying state practice before invalidating 
capital punishment for the mentally retarded); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 
792 (1982) (observing that just eight states allowed the execution of someone 
convicted under the felony-murder rule); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 595–96 
(1977) (striking down the death penalty for an adult rapist and pointing out that 
only one state authorized this sentence). 
 73 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570–73 (2003) (examining state statutes 
and noting that only nine states banned same-sex relations); Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (observing that assisted suicide is banned in 
every state); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 139–40 (1973) (noting a liberalizing trend in 
state abortion statutes); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 554–55 (1961) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that the Connecticut statute banning artificial 
contraception under most circumstances (and later struck down in Griswold v. 
Connecticut) was the only one of its kind in the nation). 
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constitutional issues, the question is whether Article Five 
petitions approved by the state legislatures should get a 
similar level of respect.74  Two distinctions between a state 
law and a state convention petition that could justify different 
treatment can be easily dismissed.  First, a state petition may 
not be vetoed by the Governor, which makes it easier to enact 
than a statute.75  Second, a call for a new conclave lacks the 
concrete impact of most state statutes, and thus can be viewed 
as nothing more than symbolic vote.  Neither of these 
distinctions, however, diminishes the fact that these petitions 
come from elected bodies and (especially when the number of 
states involved gets high enough) represent a considered 
judgment by the electorate about constitutional values. 
The more substantial objection to viewing state statutes 
and Article Five petitions as interpretive equivalents is that 
the latter are essentially conceding that the Constitution must 
be changed to reach the meaning they seek.  Put another way, 
judges could say that the fact that thirty states want a 
convention on some issue confirms that a contrary holding of 
the Court on the same question correctly reads the present 
text.  But there are at least two significant problems with this 
argument.  First, it is just as plausible to say that a 
convention call is seeking to restore the true meaning of the 
Constitution from a false judicial construction, which would 
not make these petitions a concession at all.  Second, it must 
be said that state statutes that ban a specific practice (such as 
capital punishment for juvenile offenders) do not necessarily 
say anything about the constitutionality of that practice, but 
the Court still claims that they do.76  As a result, it is rather 
hard to insist that a close nexus must exist between a state 
petition and that legislature‘s reading of the Constitution.  
The more logical reading of the Court‘s cases using legislative 
 
 74 At least one commentator contends that the Article Five standard for ratifying 
an amendment should be used to determine whether state legislation represents a 
consensus.  See Clark, supra note 15, at 1200 (―Because Article V requires the 
approval of three-fourths of the states to amend the Constitution, construing 
ambiguous constitutional provisions to authorize courts to invalidate punishments 
based on the views of fewer than three-quarters of the states would arguably 
contradict the spirit, if not the letter, of Article V.‖).  As Professor Clark concedes, 
however, the Court‘s recent cases do not apply such a rigorous test.  See id. (―As 
discussed, twenty states continued to authorize the juvenile death penalty when the 
Court invalidated the punishment as ‗cruel and unusual.‘‖). 
 75 See CAPLAN, supra note 7, at 103–05 (summarizing the argument against the 
veto of a petition).  To be fair, this is an unsettled point, but for purposes of 
discussion I will assume that no veto is possible. 
 76 State laws permitting a questionable practice, by contrast, do offer useful 
guidance by putting those states on the record that the practice is constitutional. 
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sentiment is that the issue is whether enough states take a 
position on the question at hand to say something about 
contemporary mores, and that can be done via a statute or 
through the Article Five process. 
While the formal arguments for the authority of Article 
Five petitions are well grounded in the cases, there is also the 
intangible effect that a serious convention drive might have on 
the Court.  It is doubtful that the Justices are any more 
excited about a convention than Congress, which raises the 
question of whether—on an issue that is justiciable—the 
Court might back down rather than stand fast with a position 
that is fueling discontent. 
The historical record does not provide a clear answer on 
this point.  With respect to the apportionment petitions 
discussed earlier, the Court did not retreat from its ―one-
person, one-vote‖ holdings, although Chief Justice Warren did 
take the unusual step of publicly criticizing the convention 
petitions.77  On the other hand, the Court certainly has caved 
to institutional pressure before, most notably in the wake of 
Franklin D. Roosevelt‘s landslide victory in 1936.78  At a 
minimum, it is fair to say that the Court could not totally 
ignore the implications of a possible convention if a case before 
it spoke directly to the question being discussed by the public. 
In sum, the Article Five petition mechanism can 
memorialize the constitutional views of the public in a form 
that is easily cited and recognizable to judges.  Moreover, the 
threat posed by a convention would act as a thumb on the 
scales of justice just as it does in the halls of Congress.  In this 
case, politics and law compliment each other. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
It is only natural for lawyers to focus more on interpretation 
than on creation.  The case method in law school teaching and 
the veneration of past constitutional achievements tend to 
stunt thoughts about institutional design and innovation.79  
Nevertheless, there are plenty of people who keep the flame of 
 
 77 See KYVIG, supra note 7, at 372–73 (describing Warren‘s speech to the 
American Law Institute, in which he stated that the package of states‘-rights 
amendments ―could radically change the character of our institutions‖). 
 78 See generally JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938) 
(providing a riveting account of the ―switch-in-time‖). 
 79 Indeed, this is one of Sandy Levinson‘s most powerful points in his criticism of 
the Constitution as ―undemocratic.‖  See LEVINSON, supra note 4, at 16–20 
(discussing the need to overcome veneration). 
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change alive and are working to bring their legal vision 
(conservative or liberal) into the document.  This Essay argued 
that their best approach may involve seeking Article Five 
convention petitions from the state legislatures.  Practical 
political realities, not formalities, suggest that the petition 
procedure offers a wealth of resources that public interest 
lawyers should exploit.80 
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